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Abstract
In article the modification of the Blom’s keys preliminary distribution scheme, considering the
direction of information streams is suggested. For this modification it is necessary to use function from
three variables. Function of formation of key materials will be the asymmetrical. The exponential
form of this function which does not increase the volume of key materials is suggested.
Keywords: keys pre-distribution scheme, Blom’s scheme, security model, ID-based cryp-
tography.
1 Introduction
Keys preliminary distribution schemes are used for the organization of users interaction on
secure channels in communication network. The main idea consists that each user receives a
set of key materials on the basis of which he can calculate the common key of enciphering with
any other user of system, using open information.
The Blom’s keys preliminary distribution scheme is based on interaction model ”everyone
with everyone”. However such approach can be used only in networks with the entrusted users.
In the modern global networks the approach in which there are restrictions for the privileges of
users is used. There can be restrictions as on actions of the user in all network, and on access
to resources. There are several ways for solution these tasks. One of approaches received the
name ID-based cryptography [1].
Now problems of ID-based cryptography are solved with the enciphering asymmetric algo-
rithms. The main idea consists in development of key information on the basis of identifiers
[1] or user attributes [2]. Recently ID-based cryptography develops in the direction of the ap-
proaches allowing contacting any subscriber of network only on the basis of open information.
Each user of network has to receive some certificate from certification center. In many articles
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problems of sending the ciphered messages and the digital signature by means of cryptographic
algorithms are solved with an open key. The main lack of this approach is the common problem
of asymmetric cryptography use - larger complexity of calculations. It brings to operating time
delays. Therefore, the problem of development of ID-based cryptography fast algorithms is
relevant.
It is also necessary to consider criteria to which the attributes based cryptosystem, formu-
lated in article [3], has to satisfy:
K1: Data confidentiality.
Data shall be encrypted by the owner before their sending. The unauthorized user cannot
learn about data which were encrypted.
K2: Detail access monitoring.
In users group the system provides various access rules for each certain participant of group.
Thus, users from one group can have various access rules to data.
K3: Scalability.
The number of the registered users should not influence systems efficiency.
K4: Monitoring of actions.
Transfer the authorized user secret key attributes to other persons is inadmissible.
K5: Response of the user’s rights.
If the user quits the system, then the system can recall the rights of this user. The user,
whose rights were recall, will not be able to get access to data any more.
K6: Impossibility of conspiracy.
Users cannot unite the attributes to decipher data. Each attribute is bound to a polynomial
or a random number. Thus, users cannot enter into a collision with each other. Also distribution
of keys with restriction for interaction can be realized by means of hash functions [4].
Other approach is based on modification of keys preliminary distribution schemes. In article
[5] the modification of the Blom’s scheme allowing realizing the ban on certain information
channels between users is suggested. In articles [6, 7] the similar task is solved on the basis of the
KDP scheme keys preliminary distribution. In both cases the global exchange by information
between two users is forbidden or allowed. In actual systems it is necessary to solve a access
control problem for different type resources. Thus, the problem of keys preliminary distribution
schemes modification, considering the direction of informational streams, is relevant.
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The purpose of this article is development of the keys preliminary distribution schemes for
system taking into account types of accesses.
2 Problem definition
Let’s consider system with two basic types of access: read (r) and write (w). At initialization of
the information channel it is necessary to watch in what direction data will be transferred. Thus,
all channels have to be simplex. Let’s enter the variable s for direction of data transmission. If
the user u sends a request for opening the channel on reading, that is obtaining information,
then s = −1. If the user opens the channel on writing, that is information transfer, then s = 1.
In the keys preliminary distribution scheme to each user via a secure channel key materials
are given. On the basis of key materials with use open information the user calculates an
encrypting key. In case of simplex channels for couple of users ui and uj two keys have to
be formed: kij – key for information transfer from the user ui to the user uj, kji – key for
information transfer from the user uj to the user ui. In case of inquiry of the user of ui for
reading information to the user of uj or inquiry of the user of uj to the user of ui for record
kji key is used. In case of inquiry of the user of uj for reading information to the user of ui
or inquiry of the user of ui to the user of uj for record kij key is used. Let’s demand that the
forbidden channels of communication had a zero pair key, and legal – nonzero. We will call the
keys preliminary distribution scheme meeting these conditions simplex.
3 Algorithm for keys preliminary distribution
We realize the scheme of preliminary distribution of keys taking into account simplex channels
on the basis of the well-known Blom’s scheme. In the Blom’s keys preliminary distribution
scheme on the server the symmetric polynomial from two variables f(x, y) over the field Zp is
generated. Some number ri is compared to each user ui. Further for each user polynomials
from one variable are formed gi(x) = f(x, ri). These polynomials are transferred via secure
channels to users and saved in a secret. If necessary to develop the common key with the user
uj the user ui takes the rj element from open base and calculates value kij = gi(rj). The same
way the user of uj enters, calculating kji = gj(ri). Symmetry of a polynomial f(x, y) provides
equality kij = kji.
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For implementation of the simplex keys preliminary distribution scheme it is necessary to
consider the directions of informational streams. For accounting of the direction of streams we
will generate on the server a polynomial from three variables F (x, y, s) over the field Zp. The
variable s can accept two values (+1 or-1) and defines the direction of information stream. To
each user ui it is comparable some number ri which is sited in open form and it is protected from
changes. For each user keys distribution server forms a polynomial Gi(x, s) = F (x, ri, s) also
transfers it via a secure channel. On the basis of the function Gi(x, s) and numbers ri for the
allowed information channel kij 6= 0, and for the forbidden channels kij = 0 is generated. Both
participants of exchange have to develop an identical key on the basis of secret key materials
and open information about each other.
Let’s consider two types of user’s interaction at information transfer. First, we will stop on
a case in which the user of ui initiates obtaining information from the user of uj, that is makes
to it an inquiry on reading. The user uj sends information, beforehand having encrypts it a
key
kij = Gj(ri, 1) = F (ri, rj, 1).
The parameter s = 1, as for user uj the informational stream is proceeding. The user ui
receives the message and decrypts it the same key, calculated on the basis of the key materials:
kji = Gi(rj,−1) = F (rj, ri,−1).
The parameter s = −1, as for ui the informational stream is entering.
The second case consists that the user ui initiates sending information to the user uj, making
to it an inquiry on record. The user ui sends information, beforehand having encrypted it a
key
kij = Gi(rj , 1) = F (rj, ri, 1).
The parameter s = 1, as for ui the informational stream is proceeding. The user uj receives
the message and decrypts it the same key, calculated on the basis of the key materials:
kij = Gj(ri,−1) = F (rj, ri,−1).
The parameter s = −1, as for uj the informational stream is entering. From consideration of
these two cases three requirements imposed on function F (x, y, s):
F (x, y, 1) 6= F (y, x, 1), F (x, y,−1) 6= F (y, x,−1), F (x, y, 1) = F (y, x,−1).
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The first two requirements come down to asymmetry of function F (x, y, s) to shift of the first two
arguments at any value of the third argument. For cryptographic firmness it is also necessary
to demand that function F (x, y, s) evaluation was impossible on the basis of the known value
F (y, x, s).
Let’s set function F(x,y,s) in a form:
F (x, y, 1) = xh(y), F (x, y,−1) = yh(x).
h(x) is some polynomial from one variable. This function meets all three requirements, which
are listed above. The cryptographic firmness of this function is provided with complexity of
integer logarithm problems and calculation of a root in terminating fields.
Let’s consider the keys distribution scheme on the basis of this function. Key materials are
transferred to each user. The user calculates function from two variables:
Gi(x, 1) = F (x, ri, 1) = x
h(ri), Gi(x,−1) = F (x, ri,−1) = r
h(x)
i .
For calculation the function values Gi(x, 1) the user of ui needs to know one number hi = h(ri)
which the server transfers it via a secure channel.
Let’s consider more composite case of calculation Gi(x,−1). Let h(x) is polynom:
h(x) = amx
m + am−1x
m−1 + ...+ a1x+ a0.
Then value of function:
Gi(x, 1) = F (x, ri, 1) = x
h(ri) = (b(i)m )
zm ...(b
(i)
1 )
z1b
(i)
0 ,
there
b
(i)
k = r
ak
i , zk = x
k (k = 1, ..., m).
Thus, the server as key materials sends to the user ui via a secure channel the vector:
gi =
(
hi, b
(i)
m , b
(i)
m−1, ..., b
(i)
1 , b
(i)
0
)
.
These data are enough for calculation the values of function. The problem of coefficients deter-
mination for polynomial h(x) from vector coordinates gi comes down to a discrete logarithm.
This scheme slightly increases the volume of key materials. Only one number is added to
the traditional Blom’s scheme.
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Conclusion
Modification of the Blom’s scheme allows organizing messages exchange on simplex channels.
For this purpose it is necessary to refuse the idea on use of symmetric polynomials. Such
approach is caused by the fact that exchange of information becomes the asymmetrical. Calcu-
lation of a key demands use the operation of an involution. It is characteristic for all algorithms
ID-based cryptography. However the suggested scheme allows controlling the directions of in-
formational streams that is its distinctiveness.
References
[1] Shamir A. Identity-Based Cryptosystems and Signature Schemes Advances in Cryptology.
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 7, pp. 47–53 (1984).
[2] Boneh D. and Franklin M. Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. CRYPTO
’01: Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in
Cryptology, pp. 213–229 (2001).
[3] Lee C.-C., Chung P.-S. and Hwang M.-S. A Survey on Attribute-based Encryption Schemes
of Access Control in Cloud Environments. Int.J. of Network Security, 15, 4, pp.231–240
(2013).
[4] Belim S.V. and Bogachenko N.F. Distribution of Cryptographic Keys in Systems with
a Hierarchy of Objects. Automatic Control and Computer Sciences, 50, 8, pp.773–776.
(2016)
[5] Belim S.V., Belim S.Yu, Polyakov S.Yu. The Implementation of Discretionary Access Sep-
aration Using a Modified Blom’s Scheme of Key Distribution. Information Security Prob-
lems. Computer Systems, 3, pp. 72–76. (2015)
[6] Belim S.V. and Belim S.Yu. KDP Scheme of Preliminary Key Distribution in Discretionary
Security Policy. Automatic Control and Computer Sciences, 50, 8, pp.777-786. (2016)
[7] Belim S.V. and Belim S.Yu. The VPN Implementation on Base of the KDP-Scheme. CEUR
Workshop Proceedings 1732. URL: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-1732/paper3.pdf. (2016)
6
